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INTRODUCTION
In the decade following 11 September 2001, the Canadian and British governments 
adopted many controversial legal measures to fight terrorism. They especially turned 
to stricter immigration laws to exclude and remove more easily those aliens suspected 
of involvement in terrorism. This strategy has had a considerable cost to the principle 
of procedural fairness. Canadian and British legislation increasingly restricted aliens’ 
rights to legal counsel and access to evidence in deportation proceedings involving 
national security issues. To compensate for such procedural restrictions, Canada has 
adopted a controversial British system of “special advocates.” Under this system, 
specially designated lawyers are authorized to view secret evidence and represent the 
deportee in hearings from which he is excluded.
However, the European Court of Human Rights1 and the House of Lords2 
later ruled that the British special advocate system violated the European Convention 
on Human Rights. These decisions held that the system denied an individual sufficient 
knowledge of the case against him and prevented effective legal instructions to the 
special advocate. Because Canada’s lawmakers copied this procedurally flawed 
British law, they should now take these rulings into account in order to improve the 
existing Canadian version of special advocates. Lawmakers must do so in order to find 
the “best practice” that optimally balances due process rights with the State’s national 
security concerns.
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The Canadian Parliament should therefore amend its special advocate system 
-  which replicates the British one -  to require (at least) more disclosure of evidence 
to the individual to be deported, as well as permit more communication between him 
and the special advocate. Parliament should make such changes expeditiously and on 
its own initiative before the system is challenged before the Supreme Court of Canada.
COMPARATIVE ANTI-TERRORISM LAW AFTER 9/11: A REFLECTION
In 2003,1 examined Canada’s Anti-Terrorism Act3 of 2001 in a positive light.4 As one 
American reviewer put it, this work
reads as it bills itself: The article is a rousing thumbs-up for our northern 
neighbor’s legislative response to the attacks of September 11. Comparing 
Canada’s 2001 Anti-Terrorism Act to Britain’s Anti-terrorism, Crime and 
Security Act 2001 and the United States’ Patriot Act, Jenkins contends that 
Canada has found a superior way to balance protection of civil liberties with 
the fight against terrorism.5
At that time, I made two arguments to support my conclusion that, on the 
whole, Canadians had carefully improved upon foreign ideas to arrive at a tough, 
necessary, yet more rights-conscious legal response to terrorism.
First, I advocated a comparative approach to the creation and development 
of new anti-terrorism laws in Canada and elsewhere. Canada, the U.K., and the U.S. 
can learn from one another because they share similar national security concerns about 
terrorism, as well as a common law tradition that shapes and limits legal responses. 
Comparison thus encourages a best-practices approach to formulating legislation. 
With that approach, lawmakers look to foreign law in seeking the optimal balance 
between effective anti-terrorism measures and individual rights.
Second, using this comparative approach, I focused on the ATA s controversial 
changes to Canadian criminal law. Specifically, I compared terrorist offences, 
restrictions on financing terrorism, investigatory powers of the police, and hate crimes 
provisions found in Canadian, British, and American legislation. For example, the 
definition of terrorism in Canada’s ATA was highly influenced by British law, but 
tailored to be narrower in scope. The ATA also subjected controversial provisions like
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investigative hearings and special recognizance conditions to sunset clauses, so that 
they would automatically expire after a statutory time-period.
THE EXPLOITATION OF IMMIGRATION LAW AFTER 9/11
My earlier article focused on anti-terrorism measures in the criminal law and did not 
address them in immigration law. I did not consider tougher, post-9/11 immigration 
procedures to be as controversial or constitutionally troubling as the anti-terrorism 
criminal provisions, because national legislatures and the executive branches in 
the U.S., U.K., and Canada have always possessed sweeping powers to control 
immigration and police national borders. New powers to detain immigrants were 
problematic, but did not seem to me to be as novel or far-reaching as the new criminal 
measures, which applied to the general public and potentially criminalized unpopular 
political or religious activities, beliefs, or associations. However, the Canadian and 
British governments have since used immigration law, instead of criminal law, as their 
primary tool in combating terrorism. These governments have had several incentives 
for doing so.
First, deportation proceedings afford a potential deportee fewer procedural 
rights than does prosecution under the criminal law. For example, governments 
have more latitude in immigration proceedings, than they do in criminal ones, to 
withhold evidence and the details of allegations. Second, Canadian and British courts 
considerably defer to ministerial decisions that an alien poses a risk to national security 
and should therefore be deported or detained. The State can therefore detain or deport 
an alien based on mere suspicion of that individual’s involvement in terrorist activities 
without proving its case in a criminal trial. Because of this procedural flexibility and 
focus on risk, immigration law is arguably better suited than the criminal law for 
preventing acts of terrorism before they occur. Third, because aliens make up a small, 
legally vulnerable, and politically un-influential segment of society, governments can 
discriminate against them with little political cost. Indeed, by targeting aliens through 
immigration law, the Canadian and British governments are often viewed by some 
members of their electorate as taking decisive action against potential terrorists hiding 
amongst the population.
Exploiting such advantages, the Canadian and British governments have used 
immigration law to develop a procedural “third way” between the usual alternatives of 
deportation or criminal prosecution. In other words, these governments have sought to 
detain or otherwise seriously restrict the liberty of an individual, based on suspicion 
and using procedures much weaker than under the criminal law. In Canada and the 
United Kingdom, this third way has been marked by indefinite detention and control 
orders, special advocates and restricted rights to legal counsel, and secret evidence 
withheld from the individual in question.
THE PROCEDURAL “THIRD WAY” 
1. In the UK
In the U.K., the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 20016 permitted the indefinite 
detention of an alien terrorist suspect who could not be deported to his home country 
due to a risk of torture there.7 During immigration proceedings, the deportee could 
be denied access to the Government’s evidence. He was also prohibited from 
communicating with the special advocate, who would represent him in hearings 
from which he was excluded.8 However, in the first A and Others case, the House 
of Lords declared the ATCSA detention provisions to be incompatible with the 
European Convention, because they disproportionately infringed personal liberty and 
discriminated on the grounds of nationality.9
Parliament responded to this ruling by replacing indefinite detention with 
“control orders” under the Prevention o f  Terrorism Act 2005, whereby the Government 
could seriously limit the movements and activities of both aliens and nationals.10 
Parliament authorized the use of special advocates in all control order proceedings, 
including those against citizens. As mentioned in the introduction, the ECHR (in A 
and Others v United Kingdom)11 and the House of Lords (in Secretary o f State for  
the Home Department v AF)n later found this “third way” to violate the European 
Convention, as it permitted a deprivation of liberty based solely, or to a decisive 
degree, on material withheld from the individual and without giving him adequate 
opportunities to communicate with the special advocate.
2. In Canada
The development of a procedural “third way” in Canada closely paralleled the 
developments in Britain. Canada’s security-certificate regime under the Immigration 
and Refugee Protection Act of 200113 allows indefinite detention of an alien, so long
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as a risk of torture in his home country prevents deportation and he continues to pose 
a risk to national security. As originally enacted, the IRPA14 authorized such detention 
pursuant to closed, ex parte immigration hearings, in which the person charged under 
the certificate regime was denied access to any legal representation and was not 
informed of the particulars of the charge. Under these security-certificate procedures, 
a non-deportable alien was subject to prolonged deprivation of liberty without having 
an adequate opportunity to know and challenge the government’s case against him.
In Charkaoui v Canada (Minister o f  Citizenship and Immigration),15 the 
Supreme Court of Canada held that the security-certificate proceedings violated, 
inter alia, the right to a fair hearing under the Charter. 16 This decision prompted the 
Canadian Parliament in 2008 to adopt the U.K.’s special advocate system in special 
amendments to the IRPA (IRPA Amendments), in hopes that it would meet Charter 
requirements.17 Parliament therefore chose to use a controversial foreign model, being 
legally challenged at the time before British courts and the ECHR, rather than develop 
a better procedural alternative on its own.18
A RETURN TO BEST PRACTICES: “MONITORING” FOREIGN LEGAL 
DEVELOPMENTS
The Canadian and British governments’ recourse to the procedural “third way” has 
led to serious constitutional issues in both countries. Instead of adopting a rights- 
conscious, best practices approach to protecting national security, both governments 
have together run a security-driven “race to the bottom” to find the lowest, legally 
permissible standards of due process. In this race, they have pushed the political and 
legal limits of State power, prioritized security over rights, and failed to seek the most 
proportionate or balanced responses to national security concerns. In contrast to the 
criminal law’s strong due process requirements, immigration law has given these 
governments opportunity to deprive an individual of personal liberty using the least 
exacting procedures possible.
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One method of combating this “race to the bottom” is a sophisticated 
comparative approach by all three branches of government in borrowing or adopting 
foreign counter-terrorism laws.19 The search for best practices, which proportionally 
balance rights with security, requires intellectual effort with methodological concerns 
and a political commitment to optimal solutions. This approach requires more than 
“rights-proofing” legislation, whereby governments craft laws to meet only the 
minimal, baseline legal protections of rights, either under the Canadian Charter or the 
European Convention.20 It instead requires governments to aspire to the best possible 
rights protections when creating laws that address specific national security concerns. 
In this light, foreign jurisdictions not only provide models for new anti-terrorism laws, 
but are laboratories where those models can be observed in operation over a period of 
time. Used carefully, comparative law can be a powerful tool for reflecting upon and 
eventually finding the right balance between liberty and security.
This commitment to best practices must therefore continue even after a 
legislature has incorporated foreign ideas into national anti-terrorism law. For example, 
Canadian lawmakers should have been paying attention to the continuing debates and 
legal challenges surrounding Britain’s special advocate system, after its adoption in the 
IRPA Amendments of 2008. Although foreign decisions such as A and Others and AF 
are not binding in Canada, they nevertheless address similar legal issues as Charkaoui 
and concern a special advocate system nearly identical to that in Canada. In doing so, 
they suggest that the system is not the best, most proportional way to balance rights 
and national security in security certificate cases.
When executive officials and legislators seek best practices in this way, it 
has constitutional significance on both normative and structural levels. First, when 
lawmakers critically re-examine controversial laws and improve them on their own 
initiative, they recognize that rights claims have normative validity beyond their 
enforceability in the courts. Second, lawmakers’ self-restraint encourages public 
trust (especially among politically vulnerable minorities), justifies reasonable judicial 
deference to political decisions about national security, and reduces potential points 
of friction between the political branches and the courts. The best practices approach 
therefore promotes coordinate constitutional interpretation by the executive and 
legislature, whereby the judiciary does not necessarily have the loudest or last word on 
contested constitutional issues. That is, when the political branches try to limit rights as 
little as possible, courts will have less cause to criticize or second-guess anti-terrorism
19 I detail just such a response in David Jenkins, “There and Back Again: The Strange Journey o f Special 
Advocates and Comparative Law Methodology” (forthcoming, 2011) Columbia Human Rights Law 
Review.
20 On “Charter-proofing," see Kent Roach, “The Dangers o f a Charter-Proof and Crime-Based Response 
to Terrorism” in Ronald J Daniels, Patrick Macklem, and Kent Roach, eds, The Security o f  Freedom: 
Essays on Canada s Anti-Terrorism Bill (Toronto: University o f Toronto Press, 2001) 131 at 131-38; I 
discuss rights-proofing further in the context o f special advocates systems in Jenkins, ibid.
legislation. Monitoring and self-correction are evidence of lawmakers’ commitment 
to rights, as they look for new, more effective legal protections for national security.
CONCLUSION
After the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Charkaoui, the Canadian Parliament 
failed to seek out the best possible procedural protections in security certificate cases. 
Instead, it simply adopted the existing British system of special advocates, which 
the ECHR and the House of Lords would later criticize. This legislative gamble of 
“gaming” the Charter21 -  by rights-proofing the special advocate system against 
what some thought to be the Charter’s minimum standards -  suggests the Canadian 
government’s lack of earnestness about rights. If truly committed to properly 
balancing rights with security, Canada’s current government and Parliament will heed 
these foreign courts and re-evaluate, improve, or replace the existing special advocate 
system. They should do so, notwithstanding the pending appeal of the Federal Court’s 
decision in the Harkat case,22 finding the special advocate system constitutional. The 
political duty to balance rights with security as optimally as possible exists irrespective 
of the results of litigation. If and when lawmakers in Ottawa carry out this obligation, 
the British experience will clearly show Canada’s special advocate system to be far 
from the best practice available.
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